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This thesis is a study of the management process of
management by objectives and its use as a method for manage-
ment of the United States Coast Guard information security
program. The thesis develops management by objectives as a
systematic, phased process which managers throughout the
Coast Guard security program could be encouraged to use.
Several problem areas in the security program have been
identified and analyzed. Solutions within a management by
objectives context have been proposed for these problems.
This study has combined MBO theory and discussion of specific
problems in the Coast Guard security program so that managers
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The purpose of this thesis is to study the management
concept of management by objectives and to present it in a
way that supports increased utilization of this method in
the U.S. Coast Guard information security program. This
introductory chapter begins with a general description and
appraisal of the environment in which this program functions
and concludes with a statement of the scope of this study.
B. THE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
The security program of the Coast Guard is designed to
ensure that restricting and damaging forces do not hamper,
hinder, or destroy mission effectiveness or jeopardize
national security. 1 To minimize such possibilities, certain
information of special importance to the national security
has been designated as "classified," with requirements for
its protection and usage drawn up commensurate with its
importance. Four major security areas are considered:
1. Physical security
,
the physical measures designed to
prevent unauthorized access to classified materials and
equipment.
2. Technical security, the defensive measures against
clandestine surveillance devices and schemes.
l U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Investigations and Security,




the process of determining that
civilian and military access to sensitive information is
clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
4. Communications security
, the protection of information
relating to or derived from telecommunications.
The U.S. Coast Guard is truly a unique government agency.
It is a military service, an armed force of the United States,
extensively integrated with the Navy in many operational and
support activities on the one hand; and a federal regulatory
agency situated within an otherwise entirely civilian
Department of Transportation on the other. The possibility
for role conflict and identity problems is certainly present
and has been the subject of numerous essays and articles by
concerned Coast Guard people. This dual identity lies as a
backdrop to the study of all programs undertaken by the
service. The problems encountered in the Coast Guard security
program derive from or fall within the general categories
discussed below.
1. In the pecking order of programs calling for manager-
ial resources and attention, the security program has usually
resided near the bottom. Although it has always been possible
to find commands and individuals with a zealous concern for
security, these efforts must, as a rule, be attributed to
individual initiative at whatever level in the hierarchy they
are found. One District Security Manager poignantly described
the security program's place as being on the "back-burner"
of Coast Guard priority lists.
8

2. Management control of the program continues to suffer
from a disturbing dearth of consistency and clarity both in
the written material distributed to users for their guidance
and direction and in the interpretation of requirements as
they apply to specific commands
.
3. The education of managers and users of classified
material has improved greatly in recent years but has still
not reached the desired level. Security awareness as a
pervasive condition is the desired state, one yet to be fully
realized.
One of the colorful, esteemed traditions of the Coast
Guard is the practice of encouraging individual initiative
and innovation in getting the job done. Throughout the
service, decentralized decision making and reliance upon
trained initiative are emphasized and rewarded. The develop-
ment of the tradition can be traced to a chronic shortage
of men, material, and money at many commands, necessitating a
"make do" approach to problem solving. Additionally, the
Coast Guard is a small but far-flung organization with many
units operating in remote areas virtually autonomously.
Generally speaking, the service and the public it serves
benefit in numerous ways from this mode of operation.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the program manager
who recognizes the importance of standardization for many
aspects of his program, immoderate devotion to the tradition
can greatly complicate his job. The standardization of

certain programs would contribute substantially to efficient
accomplishment of the Coast Guard missions.
C. SOME TERMS DEFINED
To provide the reader with an understanding of some of the
frequently used terms in this thesis, this section is a com-
pilation of the most important ones.
1. Access : The ability and opportunity to obtain know-
ledge or possession of classified information.
2. Classified Information : Official information which
has been determined to require, in the interests of national
security, protection against disclosure and which has been
so designated.
3. Clearance : An administrative determination by
competent authority, usually the commanding officer, that
an individual is eligible for access to classified information
of a specific classification category.
4. Command or Unit : An entity whose ranking officer has
operational and administrative authority over the personnel
and property designated as his responsibility.
5. Compromise : A security violation which has resulted
in confirmed or suspected exposure of classified information
or material to an unauthorized person.
6. Custodian: An individual who has possession of or
is otherwise charged with the responsibility for safeguarding
and accounting for classified information.
10

7. Security : A protected condition of classified infor-
mation which prevents unauthorized persons from obtaining
information of direct or indirect military value. 2
8. Security Manager : The prime mover and key individual
in the security program. Security Managers are found at
three levels in the Coast Guard organizational scheme: at
the Headquarters, District, and unit levels.
Every Coast Guard unit and the material it holds are the
responsibility of the commanding officer of that unit and
the custodian that he designates. The Security Managers,
likewise designated, are the program managers, accountable
to their immediate superior who nearly always is the command-
ing officer. The unit Security Manager is usually not simul-
taneously a custodian of classified material, although this
arrangement is not expressly forbidden. He has overall
responsibility for ensuring that the procedures, requirements
and day-to-day operation of the security program are correct,
but is directly responsible for only the material he has
"signed" for. Figure 1 is an organizational diagram of the
security program. The Security Manager's duties are numerous,
detailed, and encompassing. It suffices to say that every
matter, whether centrally or peripherally involved with
security, falls within his sphere of interest and authority.
This multi-faceted job features the roles of inspector,
educator in security matters, advisor to higher authority,
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administrator, evaluator, and resident expert, particularly
at the District level. Most District Security Managers are
Commissioned Warrant Officers with up to two decades of
experience as enlisted men of the Radioman rating and
involvement with classified material. Upon these men falls
the brunt of the security program in all four of the areas
described previously.
D. SCOPE OF STUDY
This study incorporates material from a number of sources.
The first task was a review and analysis of literature on
management by objectives (henceforth often referred to as
MBO) . A wealth of printed matter on the subject is available,
necessitating use of only the most pertinent candidates.
Secondly, interviews with the individuals holding District
Security Manager billets were conducted. These men described
their jobs and the attendant problems with obvious complete
frankness and in the most lucid way. Thirdly, the security
program of one Coast Guard district, the Twelfth Coast
District, headquarters in San Francisco, California, was
observed in detail. The method used was one of examination
of data collected from the files on each operational unit in
the district. Security inspection reports, physical security
surveys, and miscellaneous memos and messages comprise these
files. Finally, the Security Manager of the Twelfth District
was available for personal comment at length on items of
interest. And, last but not least, the author brought four
13

years of experience as a junior officer working with security-
related matters with him and did not hesitate to draw upon
the events and impressions of those years.
14

II. THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
Richard H. Hall states that MBO is an "attempt to improve
rationality in an organization and works best when objectives
are easily quantified." 3 MBO offers an approach to manager-
ial problem solving and goal formulation which provides a
means for dealing with the problems facing Security Managers.
It is a procedure by which critical analysis of organiza-
tional situations can result in identification of the need
for change and improvement. It is, therefore, the author's
opinion that management by objectives is an appropriate
concept with which to manage the Coast Guard's security
program.
A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES DEFINED
In trying to define management by objectives, one dis-
covers immediately that the term has been described different
ly by each writer on the subject. Several definitions have
been selected to illustrate the language used to express the
concept of MBO:
"In brief, the system of management by objectives
can be described as a process whereby the superior
and subordinate managers of an organization jointly
identify its common goals, define each individual's
major areas of responsibility in terms of the
results expected of him, and use these measures
3 Hall, Richard, Organizations: Structure and Process
,
p. 298, Prentice-Hall, TT7T.
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as guides for operating the unit and assessing
the contribution of each of its members." 1*
"Management by objectives and self-control may
properly be called a philosophy of management.
It rests on a concept of the job of management.
It rests on a concept of human action, behavior,
and motivation. It applies to every manager,
whatever his level and function, and to any
organization whether large or small." 5
"Managing by objectives is a strategy of
planning and getting results in the direction
that management wishes and needs to take while
meeting the goals and satisfaction of its
participants." 6
Each of these three definitions says something different
today about MBO, and in their entirety they incorporate all
of the important managerial ideas. It is important for a
manager adopting a particular technique to have a definition
at hand that can serve as the groundwork for developing his
system.
B. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The leading proponents of the MBO concept have contributed
to its evolution up to the present day. Peter Drucker was
the originator of the term and has been one of its principal
theorists. It was he who in 1954, in his book Practice of
Management, publicized the desirability of managing by




5 Drucker, P., Management: Tasks, Responsibilities,
Practice, p. 44 2,. Harper and Row, T9TTI
6Mali, P., Managing by Objectives
,




objectives from the highest to the lowest level of the
organization in a way that supports the objectives of the
highest levels of management. 7 Later, Douglas MacGregor
of Theory X and Y fame modified and expanded the MBO concept,
presenting it more as a performance appraisal technique than
as an activities integration method. 8 In recent years,
testing and research studies have been conducted of management
by objectives in practice. The implication from these
studies is that MBO can substantially improve managerial
performance, attitudes, and planning but that it is likely
to fail if insufficient time and expenditure of effort
are alloted for its implementation. 9 Today, MBO can be found
in a large number of both business and non-profit organiza-
tions. In the private sector, perhaps a majority of firms
use MBO in some form or another. Within the federal govern-
ment it is used by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. 10
C. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND THE INFORMATION SECURITY
PROGRAM OF THE COAST GUARD
There is no evidence that the tenets of MBO have ever
been made official policy for the purpose of managing the
security program in the Coast Guard. Nevertheless, the decade




8 Carroll and Tosi, p. 2.
9 Carroll and Tosi, p. 16.
10 Brady, R. H., "MBO Goes to Work in the Public Sector,"
pp. 65-74, Harvard Business Review , March-April 1973.
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of the 1970' s has seen major developments in the security
area which to some extent reflect the increased need for an
objectives-oriented way of thinking. In 1972, the Department
of Transportation published the Handbook for DOT Personnel
Security Program . This document was an attempt at a compre-
hensive, coordinated presentation of the subject and is still
in use today. Much more important to the Coast Guard, how-
ever, was the appearance in March, 1974, of the first
edition of CG-444
,
the Coast Guard Security Manual . The
two major innovations were: (1) for the first time, the
service had an identifiable security program of its own,
one that was to be managed as an ongoing, service-wide effort,
(2) establishment of the requirement for each Coast Guard
command and district office to assign a security specialist,
henceforth to be known as the Security Manager. Unquestionably,
a new way of dealing with security was in the forecast, and
some years were required for the new system to gain accept-
ance and begin to function efficiently. The Security Manager
program is now five years old and is proving to be an important
step toward effective management of the classified material




III. THE CASE FOR MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
A. THE ADVANTAGES OF MBO
As one may expect, literature concerning management by-
objectives usually presents the subject in a favorable light,
emphasizing its advantages. From information acquired from
those organizations that are managed more successfully than
others and that use an objectives-oriented approach, a list
of benefits to be obtained under MBO can be compiled. If
achieving results can be considered the primary selling
point of MBO, the following elements are regarded as tell-tale
signs of success.
1. Concentration by people working on their own or as
part of a team on the really important tasks instead of
dissipating energy on tasks which, even if done superbly
well, could have little impact on overall results and growth.
It may be true as Karl Albrecht says that within any organi-
zation, no matter how well managed, activities such as Busy
Work, Make Believe Work, Personal and Social Activities
are going on and can never really be stamped out. Albrecht
also argues, however, that the wasteful and divisive effects
of these activities can be minimized if people are shown
what has to be accomplished and are supported along the way. 11
^Albrecht, K. , Successful Management by Objectives
,
p. 12, Prentice-Hall, 1978.
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Carroll and Tosi point out that one of the overwhelming
advantages reported by managers responding to their survey
of attitudes toward MBO was that people at all levels know
what is expected of them by their bosses. 12
2. The maintenance of proper balance among innovation,
flexibility, task- force work, and the need to work effective-
ly in a well designed hierarchy to keep things running well
is maintained. Coordination of these somewhat conflicting
elements is often enhanced by the goal-oriented working
environment, in that compromise may seem more attractive
when the overall health of the organization is considered. 13
3. Forces and aids in planning. MBO ideally forces
managers to spend a significant amount of time on activities
that will move the organization forward. There is an emphasis
on future goals as well as on future problems. One can expect
a reduced incidence of crash progress or "fire fighting,"
endeavors which are costly in their utilization of scarce
resources. Another advantage is better integration of all
the goals and plans throughout the organization.
4. Provides clear standards for control. Once the
objectives are clearly stated and are found to be free of
contradiction and possible to attain, the manager can use
these objectives to control the activities and performances
of his subordinates.
1 2 Carroll and Tosi, p. 24.






5. Provides improved motivation among managers. Given
that managers in general are found to have high achievement
and self-esteem needs, it can be postulated that the establish
lishment of specific goals by or for a manager will bring
about a higher level of performance than if these goals
were absent or ambiguously stated. Experimental research
tends to confirm this. MBO provides for allowing subordinate
managers to establish their own objectives consistent with
overall organizational goals.
6. Reduces role conflict and ambiguity. Since the
objectives approach requires the superior to discuss with the
subordinate his job goals and the standards of performance
used to measure progress toward the attainment of these goals,
conflict and ambiguity are reduced. Uncertainty on the part
of a manager as to just who he is answerable to and how his
work is evaluated almost invariably results in reduced job
satisfaction and high levels of tension.
7. Provides more objective appraisal criteria. Some
of the evaluation criteria commonly used tend to be counter-
productive. Personality trait ratings are. difficult to
evaluate accurately and may not be closely related to actual
performance. Ratings by work output may also be unsatis-
factory in that the work performed may be unrelated to any
objective of the organization. With MBO, recognition is
given to the manager who accomplishes objectives rather than
to the one who merely appears to be getting things done.
21

Likewise, some of the mystery is removed from the evaluation
process by stating the standards as quantifiably as possible.
8. Identifies problems better. Provided that MBO
implementation includes good boss-subordinate interaction
to discuss goal progress, problems may surface early, before
they become major difficulties.
9. Improves the development of personnel. In assessing
the various definitions of MBO available to the reader,
Albrecht states that many "could apply just as well to
slavery as to management . "* h He refers to the lack of
attention paid to individual improvement and fulfillment by
the various theorists. Nonetheless, the development of
organizational members is also facilitated by the MBO approach
because under MBO "coaching," opportunities are improved and
deficiencies or areas for improvement are brought into focus
with greater clarity. Receptiveness to criticism can be made
more acceptable because the focus is on job-related factors
and not on individual personality characteristics. 15
B. MBO IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
One of the distinguishing characteristics of a business
enterprise is the presence of "profit," the earning of which




15 Carroll and Tosi, pp. 129-138.
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and setting goals in the organization. 16 Most of the
literature on MBO concerns its application in the business
world. In the public sector, the measurement of output and
the determination of appropriate objectives is often quite
difficult if not impossible to accomplish quantitatively.
Anthony makes it clear, though, that the government manager
should attempt to quantify whenever possible. He can do this
by subdividing the goal into segments for which tangible
definition and measurement can be made. Albrecht believes
that managers of non-profit organizations must think in terms
of payoffs and objectives even more than their profit-making
colleagues must. The reason for this is the absence of the
direct relationship between the organization and its clients/
customers; in other words, there exists a loose accountability
relationship between the parties. This system may be referred
to as a "break-loop" system as opposed to a "demand-loop"
system. In reality, managers in the public sector must
manage by objectives because these objectives are ostensibly
their very reasons for existence. 17 As mentioned before,
HEW has been using management by objectives for some time.
The results have been satisfying, particularly because the
challenge of the methodology demands creativity and clarity
of thought in problem solving. 18
16Anthony and Herzlinger, Management Control in Nonprofit
Organizations
,
p. 2, Irwin, 1975
.
17Albrecht, p. 125.
18 Brady, pp. 65-74.
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Other types of nonprofit organizations successfully use
management by objectives and have achieved measurable
results to attest to their success. Odiorne points out that
a number of church bodies have adopted MBO- centered management
systems which have eliminated many activities for which there
was no clear purpose. The bottom line for these churches
has been steadily increasing membership. They are, like the
Coast Guard and other military services, organizations that
have a large measure of tradition incorporated in their mode
of operation. Although tradition is by no means antithetical
to MBO, it must be tempered by reality which calls for a
forward looking frame of mind. 19
C. MBO AND THE SECURITY PROGRAM
An initial assessment of the relevance of management by
objectives to the Coast Guard security program may lead one
to negative conclusions. A security program may not seem
well-suited for MBO treatment when one considers a term
introduced by Professor W. J. Haga of the Naval Postgraduate
School known as "blunderfret. " A blunderfret is a type of
behavior found in bureaucratic organizations in which the
individual receives little if any reward for a good performance
but may be severely upbraided or punished for a mistake. The
person responds accordingly with behavior that is cautious,
19 0diorne, G., "The George Odiorne Management by Objectives
Newsletter," Volume IX, Number 4, MBO, Inc., April, 1979.
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timorous, lacking in creativity, and inflexible with regard
to the rules. In many ways, the jobs of custodian of and
user of classified material fall within this category. A
junior officer newly assigned as custodian often wonders if
there is any sort of benefit or opportunity from his position.
Since management by objectives rewards innovation, encourages
a proper amount of flexibility, and clarifies appraisal
criteria, it would seem that perhaps some other, less demanding
management philosophy would be appropriate for managing classi-
fied material.
The fact is, however, that reward and recognition for
a job well done do exist in the security program. The unit
Security Manager, custodian, or user of classified material
knows full well that having a smoothly run, low-key security
program that attracts no attention to itself and goes from
one inspection to the next without discrepancies has its own
reward. The loss or compromise of a document brings about
unwanted attention in the form of investigations, message
reports to higher authority, embarrassment to the command,
and an unsavory reputation. Every commanding officer is
grateful if security discrepancies are avoided and not added
to his list of problems. Every fitness report he prepares
on a junior officer includes an evaluation of all of the
tasks assigned that officer, including custodian and Security
Manager.
The existing attitudes or perceptions of various people
involved with security are not the topics of discussion in
25

this paper. This is because MBO is an appropriate way to
alter behavior, orienting it toward the goals of the
organization. Good attitudes are generally desirable things
to have but are inferred from behavior and are not factors
which can be manipulated in an effort to change behavior.
Management by objectives rewards results, not attitudes, and
encourages those behaviors that are commensurate with
accomplishment of objectives. If there is an attitude
problem in the Coast Guard with regard to classified
material, the way to handle it is to adopt a goal-oriented
approach complete with more specific rewards for good per-
formance. Perhaps the gratitude of a commanding officer or
Admiral filling the shoes of District Commander is reward
enough in an MBO system. But as will be discussed later,
education and awareness of the problems and the contributions
of persons in the program are more vital elements that can




IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
A. PITFALLS IN MBO
Before discussing the implementation and administration
of management by objectives and the treatment of specific
deficiencies in the Coast Guard security program, it is
necessary to mention some of the difficulties involved, with
a view toward their prevention.
Although enhanced flexibility was mentioned as one of the
selling points of managing by objectives, the reverse can
easily happen when procedure replaces judgment, over-control
replaces initiative and overall rigidity sets in. One of the
causes of this problem is the notion that MBO must be a
step-by-step list of procedures to be checked off, whereas
in reality it is ordinarily used as a framework with varying
degrees of latitude permissible.
The paperwork burden can become excessive. If the manager
becomes too enmeshed in the system, so that he "loses the
forest for the trees," the paperwork system can act to drain
scarce resources. Obsession with plans, reports, status
checks, and the like is detrimental to the efficient opera-
tion of management by objectives.
Closely related to the problem of rigidity replacing
flexibility is the temptation to cling to original plans and





A dangerous combination is the attempt to install manage-
ment by objectives in the context of a punitive Theory X
environment, which assumes the need for threats or force to
get people to put forth effort. The outcome is often an
adversary relationship between manager and subordinate. The
latter perceives MBO as a threatening proposition, one that
will be used to wrench more effort or work out of him without
adequate compensation. Poor performance and inappropriate
behavior should be discouraged and punished, but MBO should
not be regarded as an invitation to dictatorial styles of
management.
Another pitfall is the Too Much, Too Soon situation which
typically arises when top management initially decides to
establish a management by objectives program. A situation
that may otherwise result in enthusiastic support from the
subordinates can turn into a state of confusion when managers
attempt to do too much, too soon. 20
Thomas Kleber has compiled a list of the most common
errors in goal setting. Of special interest are the five
mentioned below.
1. The individual is held accountable for something
beyond his control. If objectives are set in areas not
controllable by the subordinate, the result may be frustra-
tion and discouragement.
2 o Albrecht, pp. 174-182
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2. The goals fail to identify joint responsibility
situations. An individual's goals should identify joint
responsibilities, identify who the responsibilities are
shared with, and identify as thoroughly as possible the
extent of each individual's responsibility.
3. More than one person is given responsibility for a
particular objective. It is not desirable that two or more
individuals be permitted to believe themselves responsible
for doing the same things.
4. Methods of work instead of goals are stressed. There
is a tendency to be overly concerned with how a job is accom-
plished, neglecting the more critical priorities of results
and responsibility.
5. Useless numbers are carried as excess baggage on
goals. In the quest to quantify all outputs, it may be
overlooked that a verbal description of the output can in
some situations be more useful and more accurate. 21
B. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
At first glance management by objectives would seem a
natural system for the typical military organization. To a
great extent, the military services, including the Coast
Guard, are already highly objective-oriented organizations
with clear-cut hierarchies and procedures. But this does




not say enough because the military manager may be inade-
quately trained and inexperienced for his job. If he has
had operational assignments for the majority of his career,
his managerial skills may indeed be quite formidible but
be characterized by lack of exposure to a wide variety of
situations he is likely to find in other jobs. The military
is somewhat unique in this sense. There is frequently a
high turnover rate of military managers, a problem that is
especially pronounced in the Coast Guard with its intense
competition for the good jobs, the service-induced desira-
bility of personnel having the opportunity to work in fields
new to them, and the great diversity of jobs a person may
encounter in a career. High turnover rates can mean for
managers the presence of inexperience and ill-understood
boundaries of responsibility.
Management and staff positions do not always have the
prestige and career-enhancing potential of operational work.
Along this line, a strong tendency exists for the manager to
strive for short-term goals and recognition so that evidence
of his work will be visible to his superiors. A manager can
be working at a torrid pace but be doing things which are
unrelated or unimportant to any long-range goals of organiza-
tion. 22 Recalling once again the ideas of Professor Haga, a
situation such as this can be described as a "firecracker,"
one in which the supposed purpose or nature of the work itself
22 Fox, J., Arming America
,
pp. 188-195, Harvard Press, 1974.
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is obscure or non-existent. Realizing this, the person will
seek to do those activities that will give evidence of hard
work, high visibility, or positive contribution but may make
negligible contribution to overall organizational goals.
In light of these problems, the military organization
particularly needs to be alert in its use of MBO and not
assume that the highly structured nature of the organization
precludes difficulties. This section of the thesis is pro-
vided solely for the purpose of making potential users of
management by objectives aware of some of the background
factors possessing a momentum which may be very difficult
to correct or deflect.
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V. HOW TO MANAGE BY OBJECTIVES
A. THE PHASES OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
MBO is a process of planning which is anticipatory in
nature and requires considerable preparation. A manager will
achieve greatest success using a systematic, phased approach
to his task. In nearly all human endeavors, achievement of
an objective is a result of a logically ordered sequence of
events. MBO allows the manager to perform his task of guiding
the organization in a systematic manner.
As with the various definitions of the concept, a variety
of implementation schemes are available to the user. As
amended for Coast Guard use, eight suggested phases of the
process can be described.




5. Reviewing and Reconciling
6. Controlling
7. Establishing Standards
8. Appraising Performance 23
The essential elements of management by objectives are
captured in this outline. The following material is an
23Morissey, G., Management by Objectives and Results ,
pp. IX-XII, Addison Wesley, 197U.
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explanation of each phase. Figure 2 is a flow chart of these
eight activities.
B. DEFINING ROLES AND MISSIONS
A statement of roles and missions identifies in a general
sense the nature and scope of the work to be performed. For
the organization as a whole, it identifies broad areas of
activity and involvement. For the smaller unit within the
organization, the statement includes the unique or distinctive
contributions to be made by the manager and his organization
to the upper level objectives of the entity, the commitment
to be made, and the major types of work that should be under-
taken by the unit. Although the process of preparing such a
statement can be a difficult and time-consuming one, the
effects can make the effort well worthwhile.
What factors are to be addressed by the manager in pre-
paring his list of personal roles and missions? The list
should be characterized by broadness of scope and continuity
of application. It should be broad enough to cover all
significant areas of performance and be a statement of the
nature of the work performed. Coordination and delineation
of line and staff units or individuals is important, not so
that one can be subordinated to the other but so that each
understands its relationship to the other. There must be a
way to define a unit's or an individual's role in terms of a
distinctive contribution. If this is not done, the result







The setting of objectives is perhaps the most critical
activity in the MBO process because without it the other
activities have little meaning. It may be correctly thought
of as the key to effective management.
An objective is a statement of results to be achieved.
For the sake of clarity, one should avoid the categorizing
of objectives to fit a standard phrase or description, as
this process itself may be time-consuming and divert atten-
tion from the genuine need for setting a discernible goal.
Simplicity in definition is the keynote. The characteristics
of an effective goal or objective (The two words are synony-
mous for this study.) are:
1. Specificity
If quantitative, the objectives are set forth in
specific terms instead of abstractions. They directly address
what is to be achieved. If qualitative, the goals identify
specific conditions which leave as little doubt as possible
as to their attainment.
2. Payoff -Oriented
There is no doubt in management's mind that the end
conditions have value and are clearly a worthwhile thing to
attain.
3. Intrinsically Rewarding
Associated with the goal must be a reward which is
attractive to the individual and is a motivating force. This
reward may take the form of a recognition accorded the person
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for achieving the goal, a payoff associated directly with the
goal, or the satisfaction of having maintained a smoothly
running program without deficiency.
4. Realism
The target must be reasonably attainable. Uncertainty
and a margin of error are accounted for, with the whole system
resting on reasonable assumptions about the future.
5. Observability
The goal specifies a set of conditions which can be
detected, a target which can be identified to the satisfac-
tion of all concerned, especially the people responsible for
its achievement. These conditions will be clearly recognizable
when the goal has been achieved. 21*
Very few things cannot be objectivized in some manner.
The manager must decide how the work activities should be
put into objective form. To be meaningful, goals must account
for the normal work output of the unit as well as new or inno-
vative activities. The run-of-the-mill working objectives
must not be denied the attention they need.
The manager may find it desirable to start out with a
relatively small number of objectives which reflect only a
part of the total operation. The advantage here is that a
gradual start can be effective for gaining familiarity with
MBO and avoiding an abrupt change. The objectives which
2 i+Albrecht, pp. 75-76
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the manager adopts must relate to and support the roles,
missions and objectives of his superior and ultimately the
organization.
The question of subjectivity arises when goals are clearly
perceived but defy statement in measurable terms. The way to
deal with such a situation is to place in objective form
specific measurable activities which, if accomplished, will
logically lead to the subjective goal. An example of a
subjective goal is: "to improve communications with subordi-
nates." The manager would then want to conceptualize several
activities which could help him to achieve better communi-
cation. There is a final aspect to this discussion of goal
setting that may not readily come to mind. The physical act
of writing the objectives in a manner that will make them
effective working tools becomes important. The use of the
simplest terminology possible facilitates the achievement of
the objective. Additionally, a meaningful objective need not
be absolutely defensible in the eyes of all who read it. The
amount of verbiage necessary usually makes it prohibitively
tiresome even to try. The people involved who have a need to
know are the individual manager, his superior who must approve
the objective and the manager's subordinates who will help
attain the goal. A word of caution -- the objective must be
clear for all succeeding and prospective occupiers of the
position. It has been stated previously that the military
environment experiences relatively rapid turnover of managers.
That being the case, the new manager arriving at his desk
37

must be able to understand the objectives as formulated before
his assumption of the position, goals which can then expand
or be revised as necessary.
Odiorne advocates the use of scenario writing, in which
a verbal picture describing the future in stylistic and verbal
imagery is produced. The scenario is not an unrealistic dream
but a statement of the conditions that would exist if the
organization arrived at some future state successfully. The
scenario can be an especially attractive, innovative idea,
a modification of an existing situation, or an entirely new
concept. The principal function of the scenario is not to
supplant objectives but to better define those objectives. 25
The previous section was concerned with roles and missions
Although it seems difficult to distinguish between "roles
and missions" and "setting objectives," the purpose of each
is different. The former is basically continuing and less
specific in nature. The latter is quite specific and usually
includes a definite point of completion or accomplishment.
Objectives inject substance, tangibility, and direction into
role definition.
D. PROGRAMMING
Programming may be defined as "establishing a plan of
action to follow in reaching objectives." 25 The basic
25 0diorne, G., "The George Odiorne Management by Objectives




interrogative has changed from "what" in the case of setting
objectives to "how" in programming. The manager knows where
he is going but needs to decide how to get there. The manager
will, when programming an objective, lay out the route to
follow by evaluating the various methods available to him.
The act of programming is important in another way in that it
allows information to enter the process which could make it
necessary to reconsider the objective before committing
resources
.
Programming is accomplished by breaking objectives down
into steps leading to the achievement of those objectives.
A suggested six-step procedure is as follows:
1. Thoroughly study the situation and select a preliminary
means for pursuing the objective.
2. Gain agreement and support if possible by conferring
with parties whose support is critical. Subordinates as
well as superiors should be consulted.
3. Develop a plan of action to be followed.
4. Test and review the plan by using a pilot run to see
if it works. The constraints of time and money may make this
step impossible. If so, a scenario that is of some use in
predicting success should be developed.
5. Implement the plan.
6. Follow up on the plan with a long-range view toward
establishing a complete control system.
The programming process is an excellent avenue for the
validation and confirmation of an objective. The process
39

of examining an objective in terms of its programming
requirements may strongly indicate the desirability of
modifying or rejecting an objective that originally appeared
sound. Clearly, this review process can mean considerable
saving in investment of effort. Given that well-prepared
objectives will be pursued, programming then becomes the





Scheduling may be defined as the setting of time require-
ments for the orderly accomplishment of objectives and programs
It is integrated throughout the MBO process but it is most
critical in programming since the phasing of each step must
be planned to ensure satisfactory achievement of the objective.
Scheduling involves the assignment of specific blocks of
calendar time to the objectives and program steps rather than
the allocation of measures such as man-hours and like measures
of effort. The management activity requirements of scheduling
run the gamut starting with a status of primary importance,
requiring extensive research and experimentation, to a much
less important or pressing status in which logic or common
sense is the foremost ingredient.
A popular and venerable scheduling technique is the
Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) . PERT is a four-




logical manner. Initially, each program step should be
broken down into its subcomponents of events or milestones.
A time estimate is then placed on the activity required to
move from one event to the next. A determination is made
as to which program steps or events must be done in sequence
and which ones can be accomplished in parallel with or
independent of each other. Finally, the sequence of events
comprising the longest cumulative length of time is determined
and established as the critical path or sequence upon which
the entire schedule depends. A PERT system is ordinarily
represented in the form of a diagram with each event and time
requirement explained. It is a useful tool for the manager
because a plan is set before him that coordinates the
project from initiation to completion.
F. REVIEWING AND RECONCILING
Review and reconciliation is a continuous process that
goes on throughout all eight of the management activities in
the MBO plan. It provides a chance to confirm or modify what
has transpired as new ideas or information surfaces. It also
provides a final review of proposed objectives and programs
before a firm commitment to action is made.
Things can happen inadvertently --a critical step was
overlooked, something irrelevant worked its way into the
system or a major change took place. The review and reconcili
ation itself may be undertaken by any of five entities: the
individual manager himself, other senior or subordinate team
41

members, a group of disinterested peers, representatives of
other organizations, or committee members assembled for just
such a purpose. The testing of a plan through the process
of review and reconciliation contributes to the effectiveness
of the program of management by objectives.
G. CONTROLLING
"Unless a manager can measure the extent to which he is
succeeding and where special attention should be focused to
overcome obstacles, it is impossible for him to perform well." 28
Herein lies the essence of the control function, which
works up the activities the manager involves himself with to
ensure that work performed is consistent with the work planned.
Controlling lies apart from producing activities that are
measured in some way by output. To be effectively performed,
controlling should provide adequate visibility for the critical
factors being measured in a timely fashion with a minimum
of effort expended. The extremes of under- and over-controlling
are to be avoided, especially when the ease by which a manager
can slip to either extreme is considered. 29 Too much informa-
tion, particularly in the form of paperwork, can paralyze
action. Too little can result in ignorance.
The manager must first identify that relatively small
number of critical functions that will have the greatest




impact on the achievement of the objectives. He must then
concentrate his efforts toward controlling those activities
where the risk is greatest. It is not enough that higher level
management have control data available. The manager directly
accountable for the action must also have the data simultane-
ously with top management. It is a discouraging thing for a
manager to be told of a problem in his unit via a report
first submitted to his superior and then channeled downward.
This problem creates inefficiency. In summary, it can be
stated that the manager wants to find the balance that will
provide him sufficient information to direct the effort of
his organization with minimum interruption of productive
work.
H. ESTABLISHING STANDARDS
The establishment of standards is the natural follow-on
to controlling. Since the central function of controlling
is the measurement of performance, there must be something
against which to measure it. Therefore, standards are
established which may be defined as a way to determine effec-
tive performance in achieving objectives. Without performance
standards, there is no clear way of knowing whether the
objectives are being achieved or of differentiating between
the relative value of work performed by subordinates for whom
reward is dispensed commensurate with their contributions.
There is no way of avoiding it -- quite often performance
standards will be imperfect and subjective. Hence there may
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be a reluctance by managers to use them. Nevertheless,
subjective evaluation should be quantified as much as possible
and understood for what it is -- an indication of satisfactory-
performance. A pitfall lies in wait for the unwary, however.
There is strong pressure in a bureaucratic organization to
establish "scoreboards" or some way of counting individual
contributions as standards of measurement.. Although the
tendency is legitimate, problems occur when inputs are
counted as outputs, or work activities irrelevant to the
objectives are nevertheless counted as contributions. The
actual, desired outputs are obfuscated by those work units
which bear little or no relation to desired outputs. Managers
must be alert to this most common type of bureaucratic
behavior.
A performance standard may itself by an objective. Any
worthwhile objective will have one or many performance
standards, either stated or implied. The difference is that
the performance standards are often more detailed than objec-
tives and are used to measure progress toward an objective.
The first problem for the manager is to determine what is to
be measured. The second is to determine what point on the
scale of measurement is held to be effective performance.
Morissey says that the four basic elements in performance
are time, resources, quality, and quantity. 30 The manager




of costly failure is greatest or the payoff of success most
substantial. The failure to meet a particular standard is an
indication of the need for corrective action.
Some of the measures that can be used as performance
standards are: the number and importance of problems and
opportunities identified, the percentage of new people trained,
success on inspections, and many, many others. It is important
to keep in mind that success in achievement of objectives
depends to a large extent on the acceptance and comprehension
of these standards by subordinate and lower level managers.
Having reached that point, the performance standards then
become effective management tools which can be used to
motivate the subordinates.
I. APPRAISING PERFORMANCE
Performance appraisal, in the words of Albrecht, has
"created more consternation than perhaps any other single
issue in American management." 31 And what is the reason for
this? "Simply stated, the problem is that most managers do
not really appriase performance; they find themselves attempting
to evaluate the individual as a person." 32 Although the latter
part of this assessment is questionable, there is no denying
that performance appraisal is a very difficult function of
management.




With management by objectives the manager and, when
appropriate, the subordinates being evaluated appraise the
performance. The focus is on the objectives and the progress
made toward them. The attitudes or personality traits of the
subordinate are set aside as irrelevant. The thing that is
relevant is the behavior and performance of the individual as
measured by the standards that have been established for,
and in some cases, by the individual being evaluated.
It was noted in the previous section on establishing
standards that there are a huge number of candidates for
measurement criteria and that the manager must select those
considered most appropriate. The same holds true for deter-
mining the specifics of performance appraisal. The general
guidelines may be stated as follows:
1. Appraisals should be conducted in the spirit of
openness and in an honest fashion. The integrity of the entire
MBO system rests upon the above-board dealings of managers and
subordinates so that all concerned can be sure that objectives
and performance related to those objectives are the true
standards
.
2. Performance appraisal should not be an isolated
"extra duty" for a manager but an integral element of the
process of management. Just as people at different levels
confer about problems, opportunities, and objectives, they
should also confer about results, progress, and expectations.
The goal is to instill objectives-oriented thinking in each
person in the organization.
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3. Odiorne suggests that the performance appraisal form
satisfy six requirements. First, it should include a job
description and the name and background of the person filling
the job. Second, it should contain a statement of the indi-
vidual's objectives for the period just prior to the period
being evaluated. Third, it should provide a means for modifi-
cation of the objectives throughout the period being evaluated.
Fourth, it should provide a means for noting any interim
reviews. Fifth, it should include a summary of the actual
results achieved during the period. Sixth, it should provide
a means to allow the manager and the subordinate to comment
on and compare the subordinate's accomplishments with the
stated objectives. 33
J. THE OBJECTIVES-ORIENTED MANAGER
What are the characteristics of the objectives-oriented
manager? Albrecht mentions a fairly comprehensive list of
eight characteristics.
1. The objectives -oriented manager is curious about the
purposes of the various activities, including his own.
2. He communicates with his colleagues in terms of
objectives by offering courses of action pursuant to
established objectives.
3. He communicates with his boss in the same manner as
frequently as possible.
33 0diorne, G., "MBO Special Report: Performance Appraisal,"
MBO, Inc. , 1976.
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4. He continually tests his own ideas against the key-
payoff questions. He thinks of ideas in terms of actions
required to bring them to fruition.
5. The objectives-oriented manager evaluates other people's
ideas and recommends courses of action based on the payoff
question.
6. He cultivates in his employees and subordinates
objectives-oriented thinking.
7. He rewards and punishes based on a comparison of
desired versus actual results.
8. The objectives -oriented manager creates and maintains
a reward-centered environment within the organization. He









VI. APPLYING MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES TO PROBLEMS OF
THE COAST GUARD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
The first five chapters of this thesis described manage-
ment by objectives theory and developed a suggested approach
to managing by this method. This chapter describes repre-
sentative problem areas and specific difficulties existing
in the Coast Guard security program and shows how the tools
and framework of management by objectives can be applied to
solve these problems. The long-range aim of this thesis is
the improved management of the security program for which
this discussion of deficiencies plaguing the program in the
short run is useful.
B. THE TOOLS AND FRAMEWORK
Albrecht has developed a model called the Objectives
Tree for use as a systems tool. 35 An adaptation of this
model will be used in this paper. The Objectives Tree is a
method of presenting the subdivision of an overall objective
in terms of the specific contributing and interrelated sub-
objectives. A filled-in Objective Tree pertinent to this
chapter appears in Figure 3. It is a breakdown of the major
organizational objective into three branches, each with
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proposed organizational objective is to improve the efficiency,
effectiveness, and managerial strength of the Coast Guard's
information security program. Sections C, D, and E of this
chapter of the thesis correspond to the three branches of
Figure 3 and identify and discuss the major problem areas
in security management. Each of these major problem areas
is in turn dealt with in terms of specific deficiencies for
which proposals for correction are offered. These proposals
are the subobjectives of each branch of the Objectives Tree.
As mentioned in the introduction, interviews with
District Security Managers were conducted by telephone.
There were twelve such men, one for each Coast Guard district.
Due to absence, vacancy, or transience due to change of
station, four of the individuals were not contacted. The
eight respondents were interviewed at great length about
their jobs using the interview format found in Figure 4.
At this point the results from questions one through four,
since these are the least complicated and require the least
elaboration, are set forth.
All but one of the respondents had held their jobs for
at least one year, with several having had two years of
experience.
The standard formal training course for District Security
Managers is the Defense Industrial Security School in
Richmond, Virginia. The course is three weeks long and
covers both physical protection measures and good security




DISTRICT SECURITY MANAGER INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
1. How long have you served as a Security Manager
at the District level?
2. What is the extent of the training and prepara-
tion you received for your job?
3. Would you describe your job as rewarding and
personally satisfying?
4. Since assuming your present billet as Security
Manager, how would you describe the performance of
the various units and commands under your jurisdiction
in terms of security?
5. What would you point out as the most serious
problem with the security program? Other problems?
6. How would you rate the progress of the commands
within your district with respect to security
education?
7. What is the most encouraging improvement that
you have seen?




Perhaps of greater significance was the experience each
brought to his job. All of them had been Radiomen of the
senior enlisted grades before being appointed to Chief
Warrant Officer. This means that they each had up to
twenty years of experience in handling classified matter and
dealing with security problems.
Half of the interviewees considered their work to be
highly rewarding and satisfying. Three were more moderate
in their enthusiasm but generally agreed that the job was
rewarding. One found his job to be totally distasteful.
Security Managers expressed a variety of opinions about
improvement trends since their work began. Three reported
"very significant" or "great" progress for the units in their
districts. Four answered in the affirmative but with
reservations. One could not make a determination because of
his recent arrival on the scene.
The third tool of analysis used in this research was the
examination of security inspection records for Twelfth Coast
Guard District operational units. U.S. Coast Guard CG-5062,
the Security Inspection Check List, is the standard, all-
inclusive form used by Security Managers on their annual
inspections of the commands in their districts. This docu-
ment is written in such detail and with such precision that
a good understanding of the condition of a given unit can be
obtained from a careful perusal of its contents and remarks.
The following points should be borne in mind with respect to
the data culled from CG-5062:
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1. The numbers of pieces of classified material
held varied from several hundred at the larger commands to
less than ten at smaller ones. This variation is not felt
to be a problem for the purposes of this study because the
Security Inspection Check List is used to evaluate pro-
cedure which is not affected significantly by the size
of the holdings.
2. The Twelfth Coast Guard District was one of
the better-managed districts in terms of security matters.
The problems revealed by the study were generally of a
less serious nature. The notable feature was that four
particular discrepancies appeared with consistency at
a significant number of units. Only the most recent
year's reports were used.
3. The author received from Coast Guard Headquarters
recent supporting documentation in the form of CG-5062's
from several large units with large holdings of classified
material. Unfortunately for the Coast Guard, the inspections,
all conducted within the past year, revealed security
"problems significant enough to draw the attention of
Headquarters level managers and to require special assist-
ance at that level. This was clear evidence that all was
not well with security elsewhere in the Coast Guard. For
the protection of those units with difficulties and in
accordance with standard procedure, the names, locations,
and specifics of their problems are not disclosed herein.
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The following sections of this chapter take up the dis-
cussion of major problem areas and provide proposals for their
treatment.
C. CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CONTROL SYSTEM STANDARDIZATION
Classified material is categorized into three systems of
accountability. First there is Communications Security Material
(COMSEC) , which is primarily cryptographic and communication
related. It is Department of Defense owned and controlled
and totally centralized. In other words, COMSEC clearly
stands apart from related classified matter and is easily
distinguishable by its issue and accountability requirements.
Second, there are Communications and Tactical Doctrine
(COMTAC) publications. COMTAC material is distributed and
controlled by the U.S. Navy and is made available to Coast
Guard units so that military cooperation and coordination
between the two services can be maintained. COMTAC docu-
ments principally deal with techniques of naval warfare and
naval capability. Last but not least is the Classified
Material Control (CMC) System into which all other classi-
fied material is placed. The documents composing the CMC
system originate from numerous and far-flung government
sources and cover a wide range of subjects. There is no
contral control or distribution authority for CMC documents.
When the District Security Manager makes his annual
inspection of a unit in his district using CG-5062, he is
concerned with the CMC system in its entirety and with the
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general condition of physical security, primarily the
condition and propriety of security containers and other
protection devices. He does not inspect COMSEC and COMTAC
systems but is authorized to suggest improvements to these
systems within the overall framework of the unit's security
education and awareness program.
Referring to Figure 3, the left branch of the Objectives
Tree lists the problem of Standardization of the CMC System.
Items 1, 2, and 3 of this section correspond to the sub-
objectives found on this branch of the objectives tree. In
calling for increased standardization of the CMC system, the
desired state of affairs is the consistent application of
control, accounting, and handling procedures for this
material. Standardization is, moreover, an excellent way
to reduce uncertainty and confusion which results from
lack of procedural clarity.
1. CMC and COMTAC
The difference in handling and control procedures
between COMTAC and CMC accounts is not clear. The problem
is this: The Coast Guard Security Manual claims complete
authority and sole jurisdiction over all classified material
not designated as COMSEC. Consequently, a question arises
as to whether it is intended that COMTAC, as well as CMC
material, fall within the purview of CG-444 . Another pub-
lication, entitled COMTAC Publications Index, CG-236-1 ,
lays out in detail the handling and accountability require-
ments for COMTAC. These procedures are virtually identical
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to the Navy's system and differ considerably from the Security
Manual's CMC procedures. The consensus among people familiar
with both systems is that CG-236-1
,
a manual distributed by
the Office of Telecommunications Policy (G-OTM) , has general
control over the material designated by it as COMTAC.
CG-444
,
a product of the Office of Investigations and
Security (G-OIS), controls the remainder, designated as CMC.
These distinctions have not been clear, however, to numerous
users in the field. Three of the District Security Managers
have reported that publications have been handled under the
wrong systems and that many custodians are not sure as to
the differences between the systems. The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that the Coast Guard Security Manual
uses terms such as CMC and CMCO (Classified Material Control
Officer) and nowhere defines them, delineates them, or provides
a job description for a CMCO. The handling procedures are
thoroughly laid out, but the manual does not address the system
as a CMC program or body of material to be recognized as such.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to clarify the
differences between CMC and COMTAC and to provide more
specific guidance to custodians and users as to the nature
of CMC.
Pursuant to rectifying this discrepancy within an MBO
context, Headquarters (G-OIS) managers should promulgate an
amendment or appendix to CG-444 making the needed clarifica-
tions pointed out above, to include a description of the type
of work that a CMCO is expected to perform. District
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Security Managers have the continuing task of keeping people
at the unit level informed on these and all other security
matters. Their tasks may range from paying specific attention
during security inspections on visits to units in their
districts to pointing out potential problem areas. In
addition to the need for setting objectives to correct the
problem, duties and mission determinations, as in the case
of the CMCO, require attention along with the establishment
of a plan of action for accomplishment of the objective.
Progress made toward the attainment of this objective
of clarifying the differences between CMC and COMTAC and the
nature of CMC itself can be determined by calculating the
reduction in the number of instances in which material from
one system is accounted for and handled by the rules of the
other system. Reports of annual inspections by District
Security Managers cite such discrepancies. Moreover, a
pervasive confidence on the part of custodians that the two
systems are well delineated and present no problems of con-
fusion or overlap would be a direct benefit and positive check.
2. Confidential Material
"Confidential" is the classification given to
material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reason-
ably be expected to cause identifiable damage to national
security. Difficulties and uncertainties exist with respect
to the requirements for handling, accounting for, and report-
ing compromise of Confidential material. The problem stems
from the fact that Confidential is the lowest of three possible
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classifications. By far the largest number of classified
documents are so labeled. Since there is so much material
of this type, classifying authorities have the decision to
either declassify some of it or to liberalize control pro-
cedures to avoid the situation of having a huge number of
publications on hand that are difficult to gain access to
because of handling restrictions. By choosing the latter
course of action, G-OIS has taken the step of removing Con-
fidential matter from accountability. 36 As has been the case
in DOD for several years, Confidential CMC documents are not
accountable, either by quantity or by individual document,
the custodian needing only to record date of receipt and date
of destruction of the individual document in some way on a
form or sheet of paper of his choosing. But concurrently, the
Coast Guard Security Manual requires the following:
a. If a Confidential item is discovered
missing, left in an unprotected state, or otherwise subjected
to compromise, the command must make prompt report to both
its district superior and G-OIS by message, beginning the
laborious process of determining why the incident occurred,
whose fault it was, what is being done to prevent recurrence,
and so forth. All of this is for a document that is non-
accountable, is not subject to inventory control, and need
not be sighted or verified in any way under normal conditions.






b. The container storage requirements for Confidential
publications are essentially the same as the requirements for
Secret material which is stored and accounted for under fairly-
rigid guidelines.
c. If a change or amendment is to be entered in
the basic Confidential publication, the publication must be
checked carefully for the presence of each page after the
entry is made. This is a peculiar requirement because it is
difficult to understand why the individual pages of the
document become for that moment accountable but the document
itself is not.
From the standpoint of management by objectives,
the basic problem seems to be confusion over the type of
program necessary for expeditious but secure use of Confi-
dential. It is not surprising that many custodians, users,
and security managers report difficulties with the handling
of Confidential material, a fact confirmed by several of the
District Security Managers interviewed.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to revise
the handling of Confidential classified material to maximize
its security, keeping in mind the operational needs for its
ready accessibility.
In terms of strategy for solution of this problem,
G-OIS should deal primarily with the dilemma facing custodians.
If a publication is important enough to report if compromised,
to stow securely when not in use, and to page-check when
amended, it should be considered important enough to require
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positive accountability. CG-444 should be revised accord-
ingly. District Security Managers should, as several have
already done, immediately institute positive control require-
ments for Confidential independently. They have authority
via the District Commander to impose such requirements on
all Coast Guard units within their jurisdiction^ It is
important that unit Security Managers and custodians realize
the jeopardy they are subject to if Confidential material
circulates at their command which is not properly accounted
for. If the material is brought under positive accountability,
a cost will be incurred in more man-hours of paper work
required in the performance of those mundane chores of
accountability. The cost is probably well worth it, however,
if the embarrassing and career-damaging event of a compromise
can be averted. It could likewise be worth the benefit in
national security and operational secrecy. Handlers of
classified material have every reason to believe that informa-
tion protected from public disclosure is so designated for a
legitimate reason.
Progress made toward the attainment of this objective
of clarifying the use of Confidential material would be
difficult to determine. Perhaps the two best possible indi-
cators would be, first, a reduction in the reported losses
of entire documents or publications classified Confidential.
Second, the added satisfaction obtained by custodians and
unit Security Managers from a tightened accounting system for
this material could indicate the importance of this objective
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from their personal standpoint. These individuals would have
less to worry about because records would always indicate
the location and holder of any particular document.
3. Destruction of Classified Material
The Coast Guard Security Manual requires classified
material to be destroyed "as soon as it is no longer required."
That ambiguous statement is the extent to which CG-444 pro-
vides guidance to custodians concerning when they are authorized
to destroy a document. Nothing about the meaning of super-
cession or the sources of authority required for destruction
is provided to assist the custodian in making timely disposal
of unneeded classified matter. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that in the most recent security inspection of units
in the Twelfth Coast Guard District, forty-four percent were
cited for not destroying documents as soon as practicable.
People are understandably reluctant to destroy something un-
less they are absolutely sure that destruction is authorized.
District Security Managers reporting excess material in CMC
accounts have found the chief reason to be uncertainty on
the part of custodians as to the proper disposition of the
material. The retention of superseded or other excess
material is discouraged because it becomes one more addition
to the administrative burden of the custodian. It also
consumes expensive space in storage containers. But, most
importantly, certain categories of superseded material are
dated, historical information not subject to change or alter-
ation. A good example is COMTAC exercise and warfare
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publications. It is therefore in many cases more useful to
a foreign government or hostile organization because of the
light it can shed on operations, exercises, or policy orches-
trated when it was being used.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to
expedite the disposal of unneeded classified material and
to reduce the expensive and cumbersome presence of those
superseded items frequently retained beyond their authorized
date of destruction.
The solution to this problem is not necessarily
difficult to formulate. In many cases, when a document arrives
at a unit and supersedes an existing document, the Letter of
Promulgation of the new arrival will specifically authorize
the destruction of its predecessor. But for the benefit
of cautious custodians, written explanation should be dis-
seminated of those conditions, terminologies, and situations
in which authority is granted for the destruction of classi-
fied material. As with other problems, revision of the Coast
Guard Security Manual could prove to be most helpful in
correcting an annoying but potentially serious security
problem.
Progress made toward attainment of this objective is
relatively easy to determine. The reduction of instances in
which superseded, unnecessary documents or publications are
found in the CMC accounts would be the best indication of
success. Indirectly, a saving would be realized because of a
reduced need for storage space and purchase of new containers
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to store superseded material. District Security Managers
would be in the best position to evaluate the degree of
success in this endeavor.
D. PERSONNEL SECURITY AND RECORDS
Personnel security in the Coast Guard is concerned with
such matters as background investigations, national agency
checks, security clearances, and access to classified
material. The publication addressing personnel security is
the Military Personnel Security Program Manual, CG-207-1 .
The use of this document requires careful examination
and interpretation. It is, in fact, one possible source
of the problems associated with personnel security. In the
experience of the author, CG-207-1 is one of the most
criticized manuals in use by the service. The criticism
arises from an apparent misunderstanding of the requirements
it sets forth. The basic aim of the personnel security
program is to ensure that users of classified material meet
all criteria for clearance and access to classified material
and that determination of eligibility for access can be made
in an expeditious manner.
The cornerstone upon which the personnel security
program is constructed is this: The commanding officer or
competent authority acting in his stead has the final and
absolute power to grant, suspend, terminate, or refuse
clearance and access to any person under his command with
regard to classified material at his command. There is a
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definite procedure he must follow if he wishes to terminate
a person's security clearance for cause, but the principle
holds that the commanding officer is ultimately responsible
for all people and material under his command, including all
classified material. The resources of the personnel security
program, including investigative background work by the special
agents in G-OIS and the Office of Personnel Security (G-PS)
,
which reviews and files completed investigations for use by
requesting commands, are essentially at the disposal of
commanding officers.
Figure 3 displays the second branch of the Objectives
Tree which calls for Improved Methods of Personnel Security
and Record Keeping. Since these two areas are so closely
related, they will be discussed together. Item 1 of this
section on personnel security and record keeping corresponds
to the subobjective found on this branch of the Objectives Tree
1. The Personnel Security and Record Keeping System
The eight District Managers interviewed were unani-
mous in their displeasure with the confusion in the personnel
security program. The problems are widespread. Since a
full review of the requirements, procedures, and pitfalls
would comprise a thesis -length document itself, it is
necessary in this case to go right to the point. The
inefficiency of the present system routinely results in two
things: delay in granting clearance and access to persons
requiring possession of classified material in the performance
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of their duties and redundant, needless processing of
clearance/access documents.
Commanding officers are anxious to minimize the time
and other resources expended on what should be the simplest
of tasks. The root of the problem is the Service Record
(S/R) , essentially a biography of the service career of an
individual member. The Service Record contains two groups
of material: sheets called "numbered pages" which are
standard for every S/R, providing data on medals and awards,
clothing issues, basic training records, and contractual
matters; and the unnumbered pages which cover a variety of
things considered pertinent or desirable. The numbered
pages are permanent and not to be removed, but the unnumbered
pages are temporary, often being removed after bulky accumu-
lation or reviews at time of reenlistment. There are a
minimum of three documents that must be present in the S/R
before a member receives clearance or access: the Certificate
of Clearance, the Acknowledgement/Termination Statement, and
a "source" document confirming successful completion of
investigative requirements. These documents are among the
unnumbered and it is purely a matter of chance whether all
three or any will be found in the Service Record of a new
arrival reporting for duty. Occasionally photocopies of
these documents are discovered but these are worthless
because original signatures are required. Getting all the
paperwork in order, including necessary correspondence, can
take weeks while the member waiting for access spends his
66

time in other, often minimally productive, activities until
everything is cleared up and he can get on with his job.
There are other accompanying problems. Some
commanding officers and unit Security Managers do not under-
stand the difference between access and clearance. Uncertainty
exists as to whether a security clearance granted by an
individual's previous CO automatically grants the member
access to material at his new command or whether a new
security clearance certificate must be issued. Neither
notion is correct. An even more common mistaken idea is
that when a member departs the command, his security clearance
as well as access must be canceled. The true situation is
that security clearances are transferable from one command
to another, but access is not. Another error ocasionally
encountered is failure by the unit Security Manager to review
the personnel records of an individual. This must be
accomplished satisfactorily so that the commanding officer
can continue the clearance of the person and permit access.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to revise
the personnel security and record keeping system to make it
more clearly understood and efficiently operated everywhere
in the Coast Guard.
The problems mentioned above can be handily treated
as a case for the application of management by objectives.
If our objective is the expeditious handling of personnel
security to provide speedy access and accurate record keeping
which enhances the integrity of the program, then perhaps
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some major changes are called for. Serious consideration
should be given to a type of program used by the Air Force.
Their system works well and is so easy to maintain that as a
model it is well worth the Coast Guard's attention. When a
person enters the Air Force, he, along with every other
recruit, is investigated in accordance with the requirement
for a Secret security clearance. (If the person will be
assigned a rating or highly classified job requiring a Top
Secret clearance, the much more extensive background investi-
gation is begun concurrently.) Upon successful completion
of the investigation, the person is issued a permanent Secret
clearance which he will retain, barring termination for cause,
for the remainder of his time in the service. He is briefed
concerning his obligations concomitant with issuance of this
clearance. This certificate of clearance then becomes a
permanent, accountable part of his Service Record. Hence-
forth, provided his clearance is not canceled at some time in
his career for reasons of disloyalty or gross misconduct,
commanding officers need no longer concern themselves with
originating or terminating his clearance but only with deter-
mining whether the individual requires access or not. Access
records are purely local items and do not become a permanent
part of the record. Clearly, this is a very efficient system.
Should the Coast Guard adopt a program similar to this
one, the District Security Managers would then have the
weighty responsibility of implementation and education
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throughout their districts. Since what has been proposed is
a major modification, management by objectives in all of its
eight phases would be an especially useful tool for the
managers effecting the change.
Progress made toward attainment of this objective of
streamlining the personnel security system can be determined
by the reduction of delays in processing clearance and access.
With the improved system, the expectation would be that each
member would move throughout the Coast Guard in the course
of his career with a greatly reduced likelihood of problems
with clearance and access. The benefit would be realized
at the individual unit level where commanding officers and
unit Security Managers would find the task of issuing clear-
ances and granting access would be expedited.
E. SECURITY EDUCATION AND AWARENESS
At the heart of the Coast Guard's information security
program lies the topic of this section of the thesis. Litera-
ture, movies, training courses, and scheduled lectures are
features of a growing effort to increase the level of security
awareness among all members of the Coast Guard. A sub-section
of CG-5062 is entitled "Security Education and Awareness" and
this subject is an important part of each annual inspection.
The eight District Security Managers interviewed were all
concerned with the subject and had much to say about it. A
variety of opinions on the progress being made toward improved
security education were revealed, ranging from "very signifi-
cant" to "wastefully inadequate." All believed, however,
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that deficiencies continue to plague the system, making
everyone's work much more difficult than necessary.
The office of the G-OIS has produced a document called
the Security Education Manual, CG-444-1
,
as an adjunct to
the Security Manual
. Its purpose is to serve as the primary
source of guidance for the security education, orientation,
and training program within the Coast Guard. 37 This publi-
cation is in many respects a sound, useful guide to the
program. It discusses various kinds of breifings that are
required or desirable for individuals working with classified
material. The format of the manual's chapter on program
implementation is remarkably similar to the steps set forth
previously for using management by objectives. Despite these
positive facts, the Security Education Manual probably has
only a minor impact on the way security affairs are con-
ducted in the Coast Guard. The two reasons for this are:
(1) the content is very general in its coverage of security
education, and (2) most of the ideas presented therein are
phrased as suggestions instead of requirements. The general
impression of the author and many other ex-Security Managers
and custodians is that few people have read or used CG-444-1 .
Many people in the Coast Guard security program are not even
aware that it exists.
This section is an expansion of the third branch of
Figure 3. It includes discussion of three specific problems
37U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Investigations ans Security,
Security Education Manual, CG-444-1 , p. 1, 1978.
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within the general topic of Security Education and Awareness.
Items 1, 2, and 3 of this section correspond to the sub-
objectives found on this branch of the Objectives Tree.
1. Security Training Program
To increase the competence of District Security
Managers, the services of the Defense Industrial Security
Institute in Richmond, Virginia, are used. A three-week course
is available on all aspects of security management. The policy
of the Coast Guard is to provide this valuable training to each
person assuming this crucial position. But when attention is
shifted to the unit level, it is found that Security Managers
and custodians of CMC and COMTAC libraries are trying to do
their jobs with virtually no training whatsoever. There is
no program for training unit level managers on a service-
wide level, nor is there a minimum competency requirement
they must attain before they assume their duties. By way of
contrast, the tightly controlled, highly organized COMSEC
program requires attendance by prospective custodians at a
one-week school for intensive training in the system. Even
with this training and the rigid by- the -numbers method
required for its management, thousands of errors are reportedly
committed by COMSEC custodians every year. One can only specu-
late on the number of mistakes in CMC, both reported and
unreported, that occur each year, in some cases subjecting
matter to loss or compromise. The typical newly commissioned
junior officer reporting aboard his first unit often finds
that one of his first jobs is to relieve either CMC or COMTAC
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custodians or both as soon as possible. After doing this, he
must then proceed to "feel" his way through the system,
culling what guidance he can from his predecessor and the
manuals. Similarly, a junior officer receiving assignment
to his unit's Security Manager post finds himself doing
much the same thing. The absence of substantive training
programs for managers of classified material is indisputable.
Although it may be impossible to prove beyond question
that the lack of mandatory, formal training programs for
managers contributes to poorly managed security programs,
this possibility certainly exists.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to raise
the level of training and competence for all custodians,
Security Managers, and users involved in the security program.
Any number of things can be done in an objectives -
oriented context to rectify the deficiencies in security
education. One suggestion is to introduce the security
program into the professional studies curriculum for Coast
Guard Academy and Officer Candidate School cadets. Real
possibilities exist here because these two groups are a
captive audience and because the vast majority of CMC and
COMTAC custodians and unit Security managers are at the
Ensign (0-1) and Lieutenant, j.g. (0-2) level. Although
the training and promotion program for enlisted persons of
the Radioman rating includes some security-related subjects,
senior enlisted personnel, E-7 or above, who assume custodial
roles should be similarly trained. Finally, an aggressive,
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locally implemented program that is specific and mandatory,
tailored for each person involved with classified material
in the Coast Guard should be considered. Since District
Security Managers are heavily involved with security educa-
tion, their contribution to overseeing the process will be
crucial to the success of the effort.
Progress made toward attainment of this objective
of improved security education would be difficult to quantify.
Probably the best indicator would be heightened awareness and
knowledge of the entire security area on the part of
users, custodians, and unit Security Managers. The District
Security Managers are in the best position to evaluate such
progress. Additionally, it may be assumed that repeated
good performances on security inspections speak for a unit's
adequate educational level over a long period of time.
This good performance measure is the best way to make a
quantifiable statement concerning a command's educational
level.
2 . Security Container Combinations
A seemingly trivial but persistent educational problem
in the security program concerns the control of security
container combinations. The seriousness of this aspect of
security education becomes more apparent when the consequences
of a compromised combination are considered. The loss of
one document or part of a document is undesirable, but such a
loss pales next to the effects of a compromise of an entire
security container's contents that could result from the loss
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of unauthorized disclosure of the combination to that
container. The combination is a bit of information that is
itself classified at the level of the highest classification
of the material safeguarded within the container and is to be
changed on those occasions specified in the Coast Guard
Security Manual
. That publication fails again to complete
its explanatory function when it neglects to provide handling
instructions for combination control. It makes no provisions
for the problems and procedures of accountability of combina-
tion record forms. Half of the District Security Managers
reported problems with regard to combinations, ranging from
failure to make changes at the required intervals to mis-
handling of combination forms, endangering thereby the security
of material stowed in the corresponding containers. In the
Twelfth Coast Guard District, a recent security inspection
revealed that more than one-third of the units were guilty
of minor infractions relating to improper handling procedures
with regard to classified combinations.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to improve
the control and handling of classified container combinations.
A suggested objectives-oriented solution would consist
primarily of a categorization of the accountability and
security requirements for classified combinations. Also
needed is the training of people having access to classified
security containers concerning this vital link of classified
combinations. More than with any other problem previously
discussed, Security Managers at individual units must bear
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the brunt of ensuring that people working for them adhere to
good security practices.
Progress made toward attainment of this objective of
improved combination control would be very difficult to quanti-
fy. It would be virtually impossible to determine that, as a
direct result of the improvements recommended above, the number
of people involved in security practices with potentially
hazardous outcomes had been reduced. It could be expected,
however, that the annual security inspections would reveal a
trend toward improved awareness of the importance of this
vital link in the security chain.
3. For Official Use Only Material
Some information generated and used by the Coast
Guard is unclassified but requires protection against uncon-
trolled release to the public at the time of its origination
or receipt. It does not fall within the requirements for
safeguarding information in the interest of national security.
The designation of this material is MFor Official Use Only"
(FOUO) . The Security Manual goes into great detail about FOUO
information, attempting to remove uncertainty about its nature
and handling. Despite this comprehensive treatment of the
subject, several of the District Security Managers stated
that many people are confused about the modus operandi for
handling FUOU material. The most common problem reported was
that people were entering For Official Use Only documents
in their CMC systems. This is definitely an outlawed practice
because CMC should contain classified matter only. A second
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problem is unfami liarity with the rules regarding release and
dissemination of FOUO to the press and other persons.
The objective for the manager using MBO is to impreve
the handling and control of For Official Use Only material
and to increase the awareness of the role this material plays
in Coast Guard operations.
The solution to these problems lies in the education
of Coast Guard personnel, almost all of whom come into contact
with For Official Use Only information in the course of their
duties, by unit and District Security Managers. Not much
else needs to be done. The task should be one of high
priority, however, because the Coast Guard has been using an
increasingly voluminous amount of FOUO material. Most of the
information so designated concerns drug and law enforcement,
a mission area moving into first place on the Coast Guard's
priority list.
Progress made toward attainment of this objective
would be determined by a reduction in the number of instances
in which FOUO is improperly handled. This determination
would be made by District Security Managers who could readily
detect the careless or overly cautious measures being used




This thesis has had as its primary goal the presentation
of a theory of management known as management by objectives
in a format that can be used by the Coast Guard manager for
the information security program. . The problems discussed in
this paper are both troublesome and persistent, and especially
well suited to the systematic approach discussed in Chapter V
for their solutions. Management by objectives is sometimes
criticized as a somewhat simplistic managerial philosophy,
of only limited usefulness. The truth or falsity of this is
not the issue here. The fact is that the information security
program in the Coast Guard need not be a complicated or nerve-
wracking system calling for rapid, high-level decision making.
Although the program is vital for the secure, effective
circulation of data throughout the service and for the main-
tenance of a high level of operational readiness, it is
basically a support program -- predictable and routine for
the most part.
This thesis has called for the establishment of objectives
for improving the management of information security. It has
done so by advocating more education, formalization, and
standardization --in short, more "organization" instead of
less. The reason for this is clearcut: The Coast Guard is
a bureaucracy in the true Weberian sense and certain of its
programs will function more efficiently as the amount of
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latitude and uncertainty on the part of members is reduced.
Information security requires good management, and using MBO
in the bureaucratic setting is in the best interests of
large organizations. One of the more emphatic District
Security Managers expressed himself on this subject in no
uncertain terms. To paraphrase, he said that the only sane
and rational way to run this business of security is to
write the book well, train people to use the book exactly,
and require that they do so. In his own district, he has
instituted a drive to independently clarify the publications
relating to security and to train his unit Security Managers
and custodians to follow his system precisely. He results
so far have been warmly received by Headquarters people.
One may wonder if line/staff friction exists in the security
program since a staff member at the district level, i.e.,
the Security Manager, occupies what is unquestionably a
position of supervision over unit Security Managers, for the
most part operational types. To the author's knowledge,
this has never been a problem, primarily because the District
Security Managers perform their jobs with such competence and
low-key exposure that they are universally respected as true
professionals. With first-rate management, as conceptualized
by management by objectives, the security program can func-
tion with great efficiency to the benefit of the Coast Guard.
This thesis does not intend to convey the idea that
everything is presently in poor condition. Many, many units
have achieved high levels of proficiency in the security
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area and boast of a well trained cadre of Security Managers,
custodians, and ordinary users.- The call for universal
standardization and training is convincing when one remembers
that these good people will be serving at their jobs for
only a very short period of time, perhaps one year on the
average, and will then be replaced by people perhaps less
motivated, interested, and able. Our goal should be to
raise the overall level of proficiency throughout the Coast
Guard.
Much work remains undone. It is hoped that this paper
will lay the groundwork for an effort to do things which
will bring an improvement to the Coast Guard information
security program and that management by objectives will be
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